Read details at Click This Link On March 7, 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman gave his 17-minute landmark speech at the Suhrawardy Uddyan where he said, among other things, “Ebarer sangram amader muktir sagram, ebarer sangram amader swadhinatar sangram…….(our struggle this time is for our emancipation, our fight this time is for our independence).” Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said in a discussion on the day that her father did not make the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on that day because it would have then been considered a ‘separationist’ move and the world would reject it. In a talk show Awami League (AL) stalwart Tofail Ahmed expounded similar philosophy, further adding that Sheikh Mujib used to tell him and others in private in those days, “You go ahead with your preparations for the independence war while I am playing a wait-and-see game with the Pakistani leaders.” Recalling the day, elderly journalist ABM Musa said on the same talk show that one could measure the depth of ocean but not the depth of wisdom and understanding of Bangabandhu. There perhaps were plenty such eulogy sessions on the occasion; I did not have the opportunity to read, hear or watch them all. Let us walk back the memory lane and study a little of the scenario prevailing at that time. After Sheikh Mujib’s AL won victory in the December 1970 elections, it was expected that an East Pakistani leader would form the government in Islamabad. Bengalis of East Pakistan were looking forward for redemption of their sufferings and deprivation of the preceeding 24 years under West Pakistani rulers. However, that was not to be. The parliamentary session to be held in Dhaka on March 3, 1971 was cancelled on March 1, thanks to power hungry Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a conniving military junta. AL immediately called an all out hartal (strike) in East Pakistan. A rally was called at Suhrawardy Uddyan on March 7. Student leaders and radical factions of the AL put pressure on Mujib to declare the UDI as East Pakistan could no longer stay united with Pakistan. In the AL parliamentary meeting on March 6, most members including Tajuddin Ahmed, the Secretary General of the party, demanded an immediate UDI, further warning that the Bengalis would have to pay a heavy price later otherwise. However, the final decision was left to Mujib. The general expectation was that Mujib would make the UDI on March 7. Accordingly, people in hundreds and thousands thronged at the Suhrawardy Uddyan next day with sticks in hand to symbolize the start of the war of independence. According to “Wintness to Surrender” by Siddiq Salek, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman sent two emissaries around midnight on March 6 to Major General Khadem Hossain Raja, the General Officer Commanding in Dhaka, requesting to be taken to custody as he was finding difficulty to contain the party hardliners demanding an immediate UDI. General Raja dismissed the idea straightway. By arresting Mujib at that point of time, he did not want to make a martyr of him and open fresh floodgate of violence in East Pakistan. The same source also revealed that in the morning on March 7, Mujib had a telephone talk with the US Ambassador Joseph Farland who advised not to count on the US if Mujib did the much expected UDI. At the Suhrawardy Uddyan, Mujib came in a hurry, delivered his 17-minute speech in which he made a 4-point demand and ended it with “Joy Bangla, Joy Pakistan.” He left the podium in equal haste, without answering questions from the press and leaving the audience utterly disappointed and in total confusion. Tofail and many other Awami pundits theorized that if Mujib made the UDI on that day, Pakistanis would have killed lacs of people on the spot by air strafing. Such an attack was militarily untenable. With the available air capability in East Pakistan at that time, such wholesale air attack was impracticable and illigical. Limited or symbolic strafing could have caused some casualties but that loss would have been much fewer than what Pakistanis did on March 25. Besides, Pakistan would not dare to commit a Jalianwala Bagh type massacre in Dhaka on that day to signal the end of Pakistan then and there. They were not militarily strong enough to face the wrath of the Bengalis as a consequence. So the theory of air or ground attack on Bengalis following an UDI on March 7 does not hold good. The reality was that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was not willing to make an UDI, for whatever reasons. He had been fighting for the autonomy of East Pakistan on the basis of his 6 points and was working with the Pakistani junta to be the next Prime Minister of Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman with aides went on to negotiate with Pakistani leaders on March 15-24 to decide the future constitution and leadership of Pakistan. What about his declaration of “Ebarer sangram swadhinatar sangram……etc then?” According to Tofail, Mujib was playing a waiting game with the Pakistanis during those days. Are you kidding? How? By allowing the junta to amass military power in East Pakistan on a daily basis aimed at conducting an obvious genocide? Why did Mujib not demand the junta during talks for an immediate halt to militarizing East Pakistan? He was rather giving daily press briefings until March 25 that the talks were ‘fruitful.’ Is that the depth of Mujb’s political wisdom and understanding? Please visit the newspaper archives for details. Sheikh Hasina said that Mujib was waiting for the right moment to declare the UDI. In other words, Sheikh Mujib waited for the Pakistanis to attack first so that he could sell his independence of Bangladesh to external world. It also implied that Mujib allowed Pakistanis to bring in enough troops and armaments to East Pakistan so that they made their killings and he could seek external assistance on those millions of dead. What a leader! What wisdom! Author: Obaid Chowdhury NY, USA